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1 Introduction 
Like many other countries, Ireland faces challenges in relation to the adequacy and sustainability of 
pensions. These challenges have been examined in detail in a series of reports (Government of 
Ireland, 2007; OECD, 2014; Government of Ireland, 2018a). All of these reports identify pension 
coverage in the private sector as a key issue. Burke and Gilhawley (2018) estimate that only 30% of 
the private sector in Ireland had a supplementary pension1 in 2017. As the State Contributory Pension 
(SCP) is paid at a flat rate, almost 70% of private sector workers are therefore set to retire without an 
earnings-related pension. For many of them, this will result in a sharp fall in living standards, as 
confirmed in our analysis. With the ageing of the Irish population, over time, pensioners will account 
for a greater proportion of the population and such income losses would represent a further macro-
economic risk of a fall in aggregate consumer spending (Government of Ireland, 2018a, p. 15). 
Almost all OECD countries have some form of a mandatory earnings-related component to their 
pension systems.2 The review of Ireland’s pension system by OECD (2014) identified an urgent need 
to increase pension coverage, through the introduction of a mandatory or quasi-mandatory scheme or 
by improving financial incentives, or both. Existing levels and patterns of pension coverage 
incorporate the impact of substantial existing tax reliefs, which provide greater financial incentives for 
those on the high rate of income tax. The Government has turned towards auto-enrolment as having 
greater potential efficacy in raising pension coverage from existing levels, particularly for those on the 
standard rate of income tax. Evidence from Cribb and Emmerson (2016) tends to support that view, 
with strong increases in coverage and pension savings arising from the UK’s auto-enrolment scheme. 
The Government’s roadmap for pension reform (Government of Ireland, 2018a) provides for the 
introduction of a new auto-enrolment retirement savings system by 2022. There are many important 
decisions to be made in the design of such a scheme, including the minimum income level at which 
auto-enrolment would begin and the contribution rates. In order to facilitate the design and 
development of a system for Ireland the Government published a draft or ‘Strawman’ proposal for an 
automatic enrolment retirement saving system as the basis for a public consultation process 
(Government of Ireland, 2018b). Under this proposal employees aged between 23 and 60, who earn 
over €20,000 a year and do not already contribute to a supplementary pension would be auto-enrolled 
into the retirement savings system. It is proposed that members will initially contribute a minimum of 
1% of gross earnings, rising to 6% after six years. Employers will match these contributions up to an 
eventual maximum of 6%, and the State will contribute €1 for every €3 saved by the member. 
Automatic Enrolment will be a ‘quasi-mandatory’ scheme where eligible employees will be enrolled 
but may choose to opt out (and forfeit employer and State contributions) within a two-month period 
after 6 months of mandatory participation. 
This report provides both microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence relevant to the design and 
impact of the auto-enrolment scheme. Section 2 begins by setting out the methods used in both the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic elements of the study, as there are linkages between the two. The 
microeconomic issues are discussed, and results of microeconomic analyses are reported in Section 3. 
We turn to the macroeconomic aspects of the pension auto-enrolment proposals in Section 4. The 
main conclusions are drawn together in Section 5.     
 
                                                     
1 The term “supplementary pension” is used here, as in the Green Paper on Pensions (Department of Social and 
Family Affairs, 2007), to refer to pensions which supplement the State pension. These are provided through a 
variety of arrangements (e.g., including pensions provided by employers – including the State as an employer- 
and pensions arranged by the self-employed).  
2 OECD (2014) noted that Ireland was one of only two member countries without a mandatory earnings-related 
pillar for retirement saving. The other was New Zealand, which introduced an automatic enrolment saving 
scheme (KiwiSaver) in 2007. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Micro-Analysis 
2.1.1 Data 
The CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) is a nationally representative annual 
household survey and the source of official data on income and poverty indicators. It provides 
information on most of the key variables of interest from the point of view of auto-enrolment e.g., 
employment status, earnings, age, and whether or not an individual is already covered by an 
occupational or personal pension scheme. While other household surveys contain some of this 
information, SILC has the key advantage of combining all this information in a single survey. 
We use the input data for SWITCH, the ESRI’s micro-simulation model of the Irish tax-benefit 
system, to derive estimates of the population that would be subject to auto-enrolment and some of its 
characteristics. It is constructed from the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of SILC: this pooled data 
provides an increased sample size which helps to improve the precision of the estimates and also 
permits finer breakdowns than a single year would permit. The SWITCH database also uprates 
monetary values (employment income, self-employment income, etc.) to 2019 levels and adjust the 
weights to match key characteristics of the 2019 population (e.g., employment levels, the number of 
tax units by taxable income band, social welfare receipts by scheme). More information on 
SWITCH’s input data and weights can be found in Appendix 1. 
2.1.2 Definitions 
The proposed auto-enrolment scheme is intended to target employees aged between 23 and 60, who 
earn over €20,000 a year and do not already contribute to a supplementary pension. While 
employment status, age and income are readily available, we only have indirect information on 
supplementary pension coverage. In particular, to account for the fact that civil servants hired before 
1995 will be entitled to a supplementary pension when they retire but do not pay contributions 
themselves, we define someone who does not currently contribute to a supplementary pension scheme 
as someone who had no pension contributions deducted from their last wage or salary payment and 
will not receive a supplementary pension paid for by themselves or their employers when they retire3. 
2.1.3 Measuring Pension Adequacy 
We start our micro-economic analysis by an examination of pension adequacy, a key consideration 
behind the auto-enrolment proposal. Pension adequacy is most often measured by the ‘final earnings 
replacement rate’ (McDonald et al., 2016, p. 630). However, a number of studies point to limitations 
of this metric (Vanderhei, 2006; Scholz and Seshadr, 2009). A well-known issue is that replacement 
rates can vary substantially when calculated on the basis of gross or net income. In OECD countries, 
for example, average earners’ gross and net replacement rates from mandatory pension scheme differ 
by an average of 10 percentage points (OECD, 2017, p. 106). The extent of this difference varies 
across countries, but across individuals with different income levels too. In this regard, our individual-
level analysis goes one step further and provides a detailed picture of the distribution of replacement 
rates on both a gross and net income basis. 
McDonald et al. (2016) define a broader ‘Living Standards Replacement Rate’ to address further 
issues with earnings replacement rates. This takes into account, for instance, net income rather than 
gross, differences in housing costs before and after retirement, a longer time period for in-work 
earnings (rather than a snapshot of final earnings), saving patterns and expenditure needs over the life 
cycle (e.g., costs associated with raising children in the middle years, medical expenses in later years) 
and household-level factors (e.g., changes in household size and composition before and after 
                                                     
3 These conditions are identified with the variables Wage_PenD, Pen_Cont and Pension_C of the SILC 
questionnaire. However, some of this information was missing in 211 cases, or 3 per cent of all employees 
sampled. For these cases, pension coverage was imputed using a simple linear probability model of the 
likelihood to be covered based on gross employment income, age and a public sector dummy variable. 
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retirement). Using a dynamic micro-simulation model, they find that the relationship between the 
conventional earnings replacement rate and continuity in living standards is relatively weak. This 
suggests a need to examine the sensitivity of replacement rates to some of the key factors identified 
above. In this paper, we examine: 
• Gross and net replacement rates; and 
• Replacement rates before and after housing costs, due to the redemption of mortgages at or 
before retirement, as compared with mortgage repayments during the pre-retirement period.  
While the use of auto-enrolment to boost pension saving is expected to improve outcomes by 
overcoming inertia and myopic decision making, it may also lead for some individuals to what 
McDonald et al. (2016) refer to as ‘unnecessary “scrimping and saving” during young and healthy 
years when the welfare of children is possibly involved’. The fact that opt-out provisions form part of 
the scheme help to reduce, but not to eliminate this issue: the power of the default option (Beshears et 
al., 2009; Choi et al., 2004) and the automatic re-enrolment provisions can be expected to have an 
impact on some individuals for whom the appropriate decision might be to rely on the SCP for their 
retirement income. 
The income threshold provided for in the proposal is partly aimed at addressing this issue. The 
proposed figure (€20,000) comes from an analysis of the net replacement rate of the SCP and 
secondary old-age benefits at various income levels, which falls from 78% at €20,000 to 65% at 
€25,000 (Government of Ireland, 2018b). 
While the final earnings replacement rate is ‘the most widespread metric for evaluating the adequacy 
of retirement savings’ (McDonald et al., 2016), this cannot be observed for those currently in 
employment at younger or middle ages. Our calculations, like those in the proposal, can be regarded 
as ‘snapshot’ replacement rates: the replacement rate that would be obtained if the individual moved 
from their current employment income to the SCP at the maximum rate. The final earnings 
replacement rate and the snapshot rate will coincide if the following three assumptions hold true: 
• Individual earnings grow in line with average earnings between the snapshot date and 
retirement; 
• The SCP rate also increases in line with average earnings; and 
• The individual qualifies for the maximum SCP rate upon retirement.  
The second of these assumptions seems reasonable, given government commitments on the intended 
strategy for uprating of pensions (Governement of Ireland, 2018a) and past practice. The first and 
third assumptions, however, are more problematic.  
In relation to the first assumption, earnings trajectories over the life cycle vary substantially, as wages 
tend to rise with age, potentially with a plateau. For example, the average wage of individuals with a 
Leaving Certificate is 50% higher for the 50-60 age group than for the 20-30 age group; but the 
corresponding figure for those with a university degree is close to 90%. Further investigation of this 
phenomenon is desirable but is outside the scope of the present study. This speaks for caution in the 
interpretation of replacement rates, particularly for those in the 20-40 age group. Broadly, we might 
distinguish between two types of low-income earner at younger ages: those who will remain at low 
incomes, with wages rising in line with wage growth, and those who are on an upward wage 
trajectory. Snapshot replacement rates are a good proxy for final earnings replacement rates in the 
former case, but not for the latter.  
The third assumption, that the individual qualifies for the maximum SCP, is also questionable: 
currently about one-third of recipients receive a rate which is between 10% and 15% below the 
maximum rate. This is subject to change for two main reasons. Trends towards increased labour 
market participation will strengthen PRSI contribution records. Qualification conditions are also set to 
change, with a move to a ‘total contributions approach’ envisaged for 2020. This is likely to increase 
numbers on the full rate, but will also involve reductions in payment rates for some future pensioners. 
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Taken together, these factors suggest that ‘snapshot’ replacement rates may be viewed as providing an 
approximate upper bound on the likely final earnings replacement rates. 
2.2 Macro-Analysis 
2.2.1 COSMO 
COSMO has been used to develop a medium-term baseline projection for the Irish economy and in 
different scenario analyses such as examining the impact of various potential Brexit scenarios on 
Ireland (see Bergin et al., 2016, Bergin et al., 2019). Similar to existing models for Ireland, COSMO 
models the behaviour of the economy in a small open economy framework and has a theoretically-
founded structure and specification. The key mechanisms of the model are described in Appendix 4. 
It is worth noting that, as a representative-agent model, COSMO does not allow for distributional 
analysis. The macro-economic analysis therefore focuses on the aggregate effects on the Irish 
economy. 
2.2.2 Modelling Auto-Enrolment 
The proposed supplementary pension contributions for employees and employers are essentially 
modelled as an increase in labour taxes with the exception that the revenue raised will not accrue to 
the public finances but rather to a pension fund. In relation to the government’s contributions, we 
assume that the government pays into the fund and that this adds to the deficit and national debt. 
Much of the scheme’s macroeconomic impact will depend on how the labour market reacts. From the 
employers’ perspective, paying the matching contributions will ultimately increase their price of 
labour and therefore reduce their demand for labour. For employees, there is some uncertainty 
regarding the impact of the introduction of auto-enrolment. There have been no empirical studies 
examining the impact of auto-enrolment on labour supply in countries that have introduced this type 
of system that we can draw on for this analysis. Therefore, we consider two approaches. The first 
approach incorporates the standard mechanism in most macroeconomic models: employees bargain 
for their real after-tax wages in the labour market. In this sense, the contributions, which pre-empt a 
proportion of every euro earned, will reduce the incentive for some workers (particularly those at the 
margin of participating in the labour market) to stay in the labour market and therefore reduce overall 
labour supply. The second approach assumes that employees may view these contributions as deferred 
income that will lead to a deferred benefit, in which case the introduction of auto-enrolment may be 
more similar to a negative shock to income in the short to medium term. In particular, as employees 
can choose to opt-out, for those who choose to stay in the scheme this is similar to a reduction in their 
current income. Ultimately, considering both approaches facilitates a more complete understanding of 
how the introduction of auto-enrolment may affect the macro-economy.  
The incidence or burden of the new contributions may not necessarily fall on the groups (employees 
and employers) on whom it is imposed. The standard result on (tax) incidence is that the burden will 
be shared by employees and employers, depending on their relative elasticities of supply and demand 
(how responsive labour supply and demand are to changes in wages). In Ireland, labour supply is very 
elastic (responsive to changes in wages) because of the possibility of migration. As a result, for the 
employee contributions, in the extreme case, if after-tax wages were to fall labour supply could fall 
substantially and firms may be willing to bear part or all of the burden of the increase in contributions 
by paying higher wages. Even though the employee contributions are formally levied on employees, 
part or all of the effective burden may be borne by the employer. In a competitive labour market, it 
makes no difference in the long run whether the contributions are imposed on employees, employers 
or some combination of both because the labour market will adjust to share the burden between them 
according to the relative elasticities of labour demand and supply. 
Overall, in the short to medium term with labour demand expected to be lower and with either labour 
supply or household income expected to be lower, we would expect overall employment to be below 
where it otherwise would be. It is important to note that employees have the option to opt out, which 
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would reduce the short to medium term cost associated with paying into the scheme. However, it 
would also reduce the long-run benefits associated with auto-enrolment. 
2.2.3 Scenarios 
We assume a 30% employee opt-out rate4 and incorporate a matching contribution from employers 
consistent with the employee contribution from each scenario and a government contribution, which 
is equivalent to a third of the employee contribution in each scenario. These assumptions are outlined 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: Description of the Scenarios Considered (changes with respect to Scenario A1 in bold) 
Scenario Features 
  
Main scenarios 
  
A1 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
A2 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: not allowed (negative income shock only) 
  
Contribution rate variants 
  
B1 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 1% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
B2 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 2% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
B3 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 3% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
B4 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 4% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
                                                     
4 As a sensitivity exercise, we include a scenario with an opt-out rate of 10% (scenario E). 
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B5 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 5% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
Other variants 
  
C Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €14,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
D1 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings in firms of at least 50 employees 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
D2 Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings in firms of less than 50 employees 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 30% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
  
E Earnings limit for auto-enrolment: €20,000 per year 
Employee contribution: 6% of all earnings 
Matching contributions: employers and State (up to earnings of €75,000 per year) 
Opt-out rate: 10% 
Labour supply response: allowed 
 
It is important to note that all of these assumptions refer to the costs of the proposed auto-enrolment 
scheme. One limitation of the analysis is that we have no estimates of how much such a scheme 
would benefit employees in the longer-term by providing additional income in retirement. As such, 
we cannot capture the scheme’s potential long-run benefits and this is an important consideration to 
bear in mind when examining the results. For this reason, we only report impacts over the short-to-
medium term: five years after fully implementing the proposal. 
To examine the potential long-term benefits, we would need to follow individuals over their life 
course and estimate how much their income would fall by in retirement and how this would be 
mitigated by paying into a pension scheme now. Specifically, we would need projections on the 
number of people retiring in each year and their earnings over their life course, which we could then 
aggregate and implement as a positive income shock in COSMO. As this type of model does not 
currently exist for Ireland, we can only provide a qualitative assessment of the potential long-run 
impact of auto-enrolment. Auto-enrolment would eventually result in a positive income shock, which 
would raise household incomes above where they otherwise would be. This would lead to higher 
consumption and domestic demand, which would in turn lead to higher output and employment in the 
non-traded sector. It is projected that those retiring in 20 years’ time after participation in the scheme 
could have, approximately, an additional 11% of their pre-retirement average career earnings in 
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retirement. These gains could rise to around 17% after 30 years, 24% after 40 years and 27% after 45 
years.5 
3 Micro-Analysis Results 
3.1 Pension Adequacy 
We first examine snapshot replacement rates (i.e., calculated as if earnings rose simply in line with 
overall wage growth and were not influenced by career progression, as described in Section 2.1.3). 
These calculations use the maximum SCP rate as the numerator and three alternative denominators. 
The first of these is simply gross labour income, giving a snapshot gross replacement rate. The 
second is labour income net of income tax, PRSI and USC, leading to a snapshot net replacement 
rate. A third calculation tries to take account of differences in housing costs before and after 
retirement, as mortgages tend to be fully repaid by or around the time of retirement. Thus, we 
consider labour income net of income tax, PRSI, USC and mortgage costs as an alternative 
denominator6. 
We focus on the population potentially eligible for auto-enrolment but consider all income ranges, 
given the issues raised in the proposal about the selection of an income threshold. As those earning 
over €75,000 per year are almost all covered by supplementary pensions already, there are very few 
cases of non-covered employees in this income bracket and these must be excluded from the analysis. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of snapshot gross replacement rates of the maximum SCP rate 
(€248.30) across income brackets.7 While some two-thirds of pensioners receive the maximum rate or 
one very close to it (98% of the maximum rate), the remaining one-third receive lower rates (typically 
85% to 90% of the maximum rate). For these cases, the gross replacement rates would be 
correspondingly lower than those shown here. 
Table 2: Snapshot Gross Replacement Rates of the Maximum Rate of the State Pension (Contributory) by Gross Annual Pay 
 Gross annual pay (€000) 
Replacement rate range (%) 0-14 14-20 20-30 30-50 50-75 
0-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10-20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 34.2 
20-30 0.0 0.0 0.1 23.3 65.8 
30-40 0.0 0.0 0.8 62.8 0.0 
40-50 0.0 0.7 46.8 13.5 0.0 
50-60 0.1 4.5 42.5 0.0 0.0 
60-70 0.6 36.0 9.9 0.0 0.0 
70-80 0.2 34.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
80+ 99.1 23.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). Notes: due to rounding error column totals may not sum to 100. The maximum rate of the 
State Pension (Contributory) is €248.30 per week. 
 
                                                     
5 These projections use the Pensions Authority’s retirement income calculator and assume a contribution rate of 
14% of gross earnings. The assumptions used are compliant with the Society of Actuaries in Ireland’s Actuarial 
Standard of Practice PEN-12 (Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2017). It should be noted that the Pensions 
Authority’s calculator does not have the specific design features of the Strawman proposal; however, it provides 
an indication of the increase in retirement income one could reasonably expect to receive based on the relevant 
actuarial standards. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
6 If continued, declining ownership rates would make this factor less of an issue in the future. 
7 Snapshot gross replacement rates of the maximum SCP rate and secondary old-age benefits show somewhat 
higher replacement rates; see Appendix 3 for more details. Given that only a minority of pensioners will receive 
all secondary benefits, we focus on the SCP only.  
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A clear pattern emerges. The maximum SCP yields high gross replacement rates at low levels of 
income, with almost all of those earning less than €14,000 having a snapshot gross replacement rate 
above 80%. As income rises, gross replacement rates fall. For example, 90% of those earning between 
€20,000 and €30,000 have snapshot gross replacement rates between 40% and 60%. 
As noted in the previous section, living standards depend on net rather than gross income. Thus, 
comparisons of net income from employment and from retirement provide a more accurate guide. 
Exemption limits for income tax implies no deduction from those wholly dependent on the SCP, and 
PRSI and USC are not levied on this benefit. Thus, net income in retirement is simply given by the 
SCP amount. The change occurs on the in-work income side, where now we use income after tax, 
PRSI and USC as the best indicator of resources available when in work, and use this as the replaced 
income. 
The results are summarised in Table 3. Now 75% of those earning between €14,000 and €20,000 have 
snapshot net replacement rates of over 70%8 – an increase of 16 percentage points from the gross 
replacement rates shown in Table 2. From €20,000 the net replacement rates are somewhat higher 
than the gross figures but remain at levels between 20% and 70%. 
 
Table 3: Snapshot Net Replacement Rates of the Maximum Rate of the State Pension (Contributory) by Gross Annual Pay 
 Gross annual pay (€000) 
Replacement rate range (%) 0-14 14-20 20-30 30-50 50-75 
0-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10-20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 46.1 
30-40 0.0 0.0 0.1 36.3 53.9 
40-50 0.0 0.3 10.2 62.9 0.0 
50-60 0.1 4.5 53.3 0.3 0.0 
60-70 0.6 20.1 35.9 0.0 0.0 
70-80 0.2 48.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 
80+ 99.1 26.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
Notes: due to rounding error column totals may not sum to 100. The maximum rate of the State Pension (Contributory) is 
€248.30 per week. 
House purchases can represent a form of saving for retirement. While a mortgage is typically paid 
during an individual’s working life, by retirement many individuals own their homes outright. The 
associated reduction in housing costs can contribute to maintaining living standards during retirement. 
We adopt a simple approach to explore the extent to which this phenomenon may contribute to a 
higher replacement rate, net of tax and mortgage costs. We calculate the ratio of the maximum SCP to 
in-work income net of income tax, PRSI, USC and mortgage costs9. 
These calculations depend on current patterns of home ownership for those of pension age. In 
interpreting the results (Table 4), we should therefore bear in mind that future home ownership rates 
for those of pension age may be lower than at present.10 
                                                     
8 70% is commonly chosen as the threshold for pension adequacy in this literature. 
9 This means that we focus on cash flows. Another approach would be to use mortgage interests only, leading to 
somewhat lower replacement rates. Note that mortgage costs are measured net of the tax relief at source on 
mortgage interest. 
10 For example, Norris (2013) discusses the drop in home ownership rates in Ireland from 80% in 1991 to 70% 
in 2011. Census 2016 figures published by the CSO show a further decline to 67.6%. 
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Table 4: Snapshot Net Replacement Rates of the Maximum Rate of the State Pension (Contributory) by Gross Annual Pay, 
Adjusted for Mortgage Costs 
 Gross annual pay (€000) 
Replacement rate range (%) 0-14 14-20 20-30 30-50 50-75 
0-10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10-20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.6 
30-40 0.0 0.0 0.1 25.2 63.3 
40-50 0.0 0.0 8.4 64.8 3.2 
50-60 0.1 4.0 48.0 6.6 0.9 
60-70 0.6 18.6 36.6 1.6 0.0 
70-80 0.3 44.4 3.2 1.4 0.0 
80+ 99.0 32.9 3.8 0.4 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
Notes: due to rounding error column totals may not sum to 100. The maximum rate of the State Pension (Contributory) is 
€248.30 per week. 
Changes in the distribution of net replacement rates are quite limited, particularly below €20,000. 
They increase somewhat for some individuals at higher incomes but remain below 70% for the vast 
majority of those earning €30,000 or over. Several factors contribute to this result. First, few of those 
with earning below €20,000 are paying for a mortgage: many are renting, or in the case of young 
adults, living with their parents. Second, even at higher income levels, those with a supplementary 
pension, associated with more stable employment, are more likely to be purchasing a home, while 
those without a supplementary pension are more likely to be renting. Third, where a couple is paying 
a mortgage, the potential saving for each individual is not the full mortgage cost but half of this. 
Taken together these features explain why savings arising from outright home ownership tend to have 
a limited impact on the distribution of net replacement rates of the target population.  
The approach adopted here does not take account of the fact that some of those who are currently 
renting will later purchase a home and benefit from outright home ownership in retirement 
(replacement rates would be higher in this group). On the other hand, there have been falls in home 
ownership rates not just among those in their 20s and early 30s, but also in the 35-44 age group. 
While the former is compatible with a phenomenon of delayed purchase, falls in ownership rates for 
those in the latter age groups suggest that ownership rates by age 65 will be lower than they are now. 
On balance, these factors suggest that home ownership has a limited impact on net replacement rates 
currently, and that this impact is not likely to increase.  
Overall, these results reinforce concerns about pension adequacy in the target population. Snapshot 
replacement rates for these individuals are typically low, and for reasons stated earlier, final earnings 
replacement rates are likely to be no higher. 
What of those individuals with low earnings? Snapshot replacement rates for those earning between 
€14,000 and €20,000 tend to be above 60% on a gross basis and improve further on a net basis. There 
are two important caveats concerning these results. Firstly, these calculations do not take account of 
individual wage growth related to age, experience and qualifications between now and retirement11. 
Secondly, these calculations are based on the maximum SCP rate. A substantial minority of 
individuals qualify for payments that are 10 or 15% lower, leading to a proportionate fall in their 
replacement rates compared to this maximum benchmark. 
The choice of an income threshold for auto-enrolment must balance different objectives. On the one 
hand, inclusion in the auto-enrolment scheme is designed to encourage individuals to overcome the 
                                                     
11 General growth in wages, and increases in pensions which are targeted to match that, can be accounted for in 
this framework, as both can be assumed to rise at the same rate, leaving the ratio unchanged. 
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inertia that can otherwise lead to under-provision for retirement. On the other hand, without an 
income threshold, the default option of auto-enrolment would include individuals for whom the SCP 
provides an adequate retirement pension. Such individuals would, of course, have the right to opt-out 
of the scheme, but the proposal does include a compulsory six-month membership period, during 
which the loss of up to 6% of earnings could pose serious difficulties for low-income earners. 
The question also arises as to whether there could be ‘inertia’ leading to sub-optimal decisions to 
remain in the scheme12. Thus, setting too high an income threshold might lead to too few individuals 
benefiting from the ‘nudge’13; but setting too low a limit might lead to some low-income individuals 
‘scrimping and saving’ for a supplementary pension when the SCP would be adequate to their needs. 
The balance suggested by the proposal is a relatively low income threshold of €20,000, but with 
consideration being given to a lower amount. Alongside affordability concerns, the main motivation 
for the €20,000 figure appears to come from snapshot replacement rates calculations. The figures 
shown above indicate relatively high snapshot replacement rates for those with earnings below 
€20,000; however, final earnings replacement rates are likely in many cases to be lower than these 
snapshot figures. This is because, as discussed earlier, earnings tend to rise over the life cycle. The 
pension fund created by auto-enrolment is based on a fixed percentage of earnings. Thus, the overall 
fund and the pension it finances does not reflect final earnings, but something more like career 
average earnings, though due to compound interest/investment returns contributions based for earlier 
years have a disproportionate influence.  Given this, it could be argued that an income threshold lower 
than €20,000 might be more appropriate. For example, the earnings of university graduates are on 
average 90% higher by age 50-60 than at 20-30.14 Thus, final gross earnings replacement rates could 
be close to half of the snapshot levels. This is due to the fact that the pension fund arising from auto-
enrolment will reflect career average earnings. For those with a relatively flat earnings profile over 
their lifetime (for example, those with lower educational attainment) career average earnings will be 
more similar to final earnings prior to retirement. However, for those whose earnings potential have a 
sharper gradient over their lifetime (for example, those with higher education), final earnings could be 
substantially higher than career average earnings, pushing their final replacement rates down.  
Earnings dynamics are a key issue here. Some individuals may experience low earnings at a point in 
time but progress above the €20,000 threshold and be auto-enrolled, while others may remain on low 
earnings throughout their life. Analysis of individual earnings could help to establish the composition 
of the low-income population15. How many make a sustained transition to higher earnings, and over 
what time period? How many are in stable, low-paid jobs over a long period? Answers to these 
questions could help to guide the setting, and revision, of a low income threshold for auto-enrolment. 
3.2 Target Population 
3.2.1 Factors influencing the likelihood of being in the auto-enrolment target group 
Before we look at the size and characteristics of the target population, we examine the factors of 
influencing the liklihood of being in the auto-enrolment target group, i.e. characteristics that are 
linked to supplementary pension non-coverage: age, gross annual pay, sex and firm size. 
Table 5 shows that the incidence of non-coverage decreases with both age and income: older workers 
and higher earners are more likely to be covered. Non-coverage is particularly prevalent among 
                                                     
12 Inertia may play less of a role when withdrawing from an auto-enrolment scheme compared to joining a 
pension scheme; in the former case the gain is immediate, while in the latter the gain from saving is in the long 
term. 
13 Even on an ‘opt-in’ basis, the proposal does provide incentives to sign up for a pension with an employer 
contribution and State support that more than match the employee’s own contribution. 
14 For other educational levels, this effect is smaller (e.g., for those with a Leaving Certificate, the average wage 
in the 50-60 age group is about 50% higher than at age 20-30). These effects are over and above wage inflation 
over time; they relate instead to individuals experiencing wage increases through their careers, which are 
unrelated to wage inflation. 
15 For example, see Kennedy et al. (2016) for an analysis of administrative data. 
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employees aged between 23 and 30, as well as those earning under €30,000. In other words, the 
proposed scheme would cause coverage to rise the most among younger employees and lower earners 
(assuming no difference in opt-out rates). As a result, the relative fall in current disposable income 
would be larger in these groups. This would likely affect younger employees’ ability to save for a 
mortgage, and affect consumption, as less well-off individuals typically consume a higher proportion 
of their current disposable income. 
Table 5: Supplementary Pension Non-Coverage Rates of Employees by Gross Annual Pay and Age (%) 
Gross annual pay (€000) 23-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51-60 years Total 
14-20 98.3 85.1 76.0 71.2 85.9 
20-30 91.1 79.8 74.6 52.8 79.8 
30-40 68.0 57.7 38.6 26.0 51.7 
40-50 37.7 33.1 29.9 13.1 30.0 
50-75 
 
13.8 16.1 6.3 16.2 
75+ 
 
17.3 4.6 3.9 9.1 
Total 75.3 51.5 42.5 31.3 52.3 
Source:  own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
Note: proportions based on a total of less than 100 cases in this age-income groups not shown. Both public and private 
sector employees included. 
Next, are men and women equally likely to face auto-enrolment? Focusing on the 23-60 age group, 
we find that a greater proportion of female employees contribute to a supplementary pension than 
their male counterparts: 59.2% compared to 52.7% for those earning over €20,000, and 52.7% 
compared to 49.7% if we also include those earning between €14,000 and €20,00016. This is partly 
explained by the fact that a greater proportion of female employees work in the public sector, where 
supplementary pension coverage is much higher than in the private sector. Consistent with this, 56.5% 
of employees qualifying for auto-enrolment are men, or 51.6% if the income threshold were set at 
€14,00017. 
Due to the nature of the data (a household survey), we have focused our attention to individuals. 
However, some information on respondents’ places of work allows us to say something about firms’ 
adjustment costs. Taking the size of these places of work as a proxy for firm size, we find that 
between 54% (€20,000 threshold) and 59% (€14,000 threshold) of employees working in firms of up 
to 50 people would be automatically enrolled, compared to 36 to 38% of employees working in firms 
above this size. This suggests that smaller firms would face larger average costs than bigger firms in 
their transition to the new system. However, it is natural to assume that some of these workplaces 
belong to larger firms (e.g., retail companies), so it is not clear how much of these adjustment costs 
would fall on small businesses. 
3.2.2 Size and Characteristics of the Target Population 
Here we provide an estimate of the size of the target population (employees aged between 23 and 60, 
who earn over €20,000 a year and do not already contribute to a supplementary pension) and examine 
its characteristics. 
Noting that ‘employees who are existing members of a pension scheme/contract which meets 
prescribed minimum standards and contribution levels will not be automatically enrolled’ 
(Government of Ireland, 2018b, p. 27) and without further detail on these minimum standards and 
contribution levels, we assume that none of those currently covered would be automatically 
                                                     
16 Over the entire income distribution, these proportions are virtually the same: 47.8% (females) and 47.6% 
(males). This is in line with the last pension module of the Labour Force Survey (Q3 2018), which found 
coverage rates in the employed 20-69 population of 47.6% (females) and 46.7% (males). 
17 Female employees earning below the income threshold will, of course, be able to join the scheme but will not 
be automatically enrolled.  
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enrolled18. However, it should be noted that recent estimates put the median total contribution rate 
(employee and employer) at between 8% and 11%, and below 10% for over one-third of schemes 
(Collins and Hughes, 2017; IAPF, 2015), well under that envisaged in the proposal (14%). Thus, if the 
standard for exclusion from auto-enrolment were set at its own target rate, the target population could 
be substantially bigger, or alternatively it may lead to a required increase in contribution rates in 
existing schemes. 
With that caveat in mind, we estimate that 584,000 employees aged between 23 and 60 would be 
automatically enrolled, or 44.2% of employees in that age group with gross annual earnings of over 
€20,000. If auto-enrolment were to start at €14,000, the target population would grow by an additional 
139,700 employees to 723,700, or 48.8% of the relevant population19. 
Table 6: Esimated Size of the Target Population by Threshold 
Threshold N % 
€14,000 723,700 48.8 
€20,000 (as per “Strawman” proposal) 584,000 44.2 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
Note: employees aged 23 to 60, who earn over the threshold and do not already contribute to a supplymentary pension. 
The Strawman proposal’s estimate of 410,000 is lower than our comparable figure of 584,000. This 
discrepancy arises from methodological differences. Firstly, we project data from 2013, 2014 and 
2015 to 2019. The Strawman proposal’s estimate, on the other hand, is based on employment and 
income figures from 2017 and 2016, thereby not taking into account the employment and wage 
growth that has taken place since then. Secondly, these figures are based on raw weights, which we 
adjust to match key characteristics of the current population using official projections of the income 
distribution. We find that this adjustment significantly improves the income representativeness of the 
data (see Appendix 1). As a result, our estimate of the number of employees for 2019 is substantially 
higher than for 2016, and wage growth over this period implies that more employees are found to earn 
over the €20,000 and €14,000 thresholds20. Different data sources (QNHS and SILC vs. SILC alone), 
assumptions for comparability across them and ways of capturing pension coverage also play a role in 
these variations. 
Table 7 summarises the main characteristics of the target population. The age profile is very similar 
under either threshold. The target population is slightly older under the lower threshold because more 
part-time workers, who are on average slightly older than full-time workers21, would qualify for auto-
enrolment. Close to 40% of the target population are under 30, and a further 30% % would be under 
40. These results do not depend on the level of the annual earnings entry point and soapply regardless 
of whether the annual earnings entry point is set at €14,000 or €20,000, due to the fact that 
supplementary pension coverage is lower for younger employees.. 
  
                                                     
18 This seems to be the assumption underlying the proposal’s own estimate. 
19 Were the lower age limit brought down to 18, 635,000 would be automatically enrolled from €20,000, or 
835,000 from €14,000. 
20 We do not attempt to project to 2022, when auto-enrolment will begin, due to inherent difficulties in obtaining 
reliable estimates of factors such as income growth and the unemployment rate beyond 2019. On current trends, 
further growth in employment and wages (unless the €20,000 threshold were to rise in line with this) would be 
expected to raise the size of the target population. A recession or ‘hard Brexit’ could work in the opposite 
direction. However, the structure of that population, as examined here, would not be substantially altered. 
21 Younger people are less likely to be concerned by activities such as rearing children or caring for a dependent, 
which are frequent reasons for taking up part-time employment. 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics of the Target Population by Auto-Enrolment Threshold 
Income threshold for auto-enrolment €14,000 €20,000 
Age (years)   
Mean 35.0 34.9 
Median 33.0 32.0 
23 to 30 42.2 41.7 
31 to 40 28.9 30.1 
40 to 50 18.9 19.6 
51 to 60 10 8.6 
Sex (%)   
Female 48.4 43.5 
Male 51.6 56.5 
Education level (%)   
Primary 3.7 2.9 
Lower secondary 7.2 6.9 
Upper secondary and non-tertiary higher education 44.8 42.6 
Tertiary 41.8 44.8 
Marital status (%)   
Married, in civil partnerhip or cohabiting, partner auto-enrolled 10.1 9.3 
Married, in civil partnerhip or cohabiting, partner not auto-enrolled 23.9 26.6 
Single 66.0 64.1 
Gross annual pay (€)   
Mean 31,783 35,293 
Median 27,389 29,836 
€14,000 to €20,000 19.3 0 
€20,000 to €30,000 40.8 50.6 
€30,000 to €50,000 32.3 40.1 
€40,000 to €75,000 5.9 7.3 
€75,000 and over 1.7 2.1 
Employment sector (%)   
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.3 1.4 
Mining, quarrying and utilities 1.1 1.4 
Manufacturing 13.1 14.4 
Construction 4.2 5.0 
Wholesale and retail 22.4 21.8 
Transport and storage 5.6 5.6 
Accommodation and food 8.4 6.5 
Information and communication 5.4 6.3 
Financial and real estate services 4.1 4.7 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 10.4 11.5 
Private administration and support 3.9 3.6 
Public administration and defence 1.5 1.7 
Education 3.1 2.5 
Health and social work 10.1 9.3 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 2.2 2.1 
Other 3.2 2.3 
Size of the workplace (%)   
< 50 people 60.8 57.6 
≥ 50 people 39.2 42.4 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(uprated monetary values and adjusted weights). 
Notes: firm size and education level were missing in approximately 3% of cases. Employment sectors are based 
on the NACE Rev.2 nomenclature and amalgamated for sectors with less than 30 observations. 
As seen in the previous section, female employees have better supplementary pension coverage than 
their male counterparts at both threshold levels. This is explained by the high proportion of women 
working in the public sector (which has much wider coverage than the private sector), even though 
they have lower coverage than men in the private sector. Thus, 57% of the target population are men 
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under the Strawman proposal’s threshold. Since women are over-represented at lower income levels, 
this gap is reduced (52% men, 48% women) under the €14,000 threshold. 
One of the concerns of auto-enrolment is the negative impact on consumption during working life. A 
potential factor mediating this effect is a person’s marital status. In particular, given that Irish couples 
tend to pool the majority of their income (Watson et al., 2013), reductions in disposable income due to 
auto-enrolment may be less severe when only one partner is in the target population. That is the case 
for around 25% of the target population, leaving 75% (singles and couples where both would be 
facing auto-enrolment) without this potential cushioning effect. 
As regards the education level, under the Strawman proposal’s threshold of €20,000 45% of the target 
population have a tertiary degree and 43% have an upper secondary or non-tertiary higher education 
qualification. As university graduates’ earnings profile is steeper, auto-enrolment has the potential of 
improving final earnings replacement rates significantly for just short of a half of the target 
population. However, the likelihood of contributing to a supplementary pension increases with 
earnings, so auto-enrolment can be seen as a push for this group to start contributing earlier. While 
those with an upper secondary or non-tertiary higher education level may have a flatter earnings 
profile, they would also likely benefit from auto-enrolment given the relatively low replacement rates 
for earnings over €20,000. 
Naturally, mean gross annual pay is higher under the Strawman proposal’s threshold of €20,000, but 
slightly lower than the national estimate of €38,871 for all employees in 201822. This suggests lower 
earnings in the target population compared to those who already contribute to a supplementary 
pension, in line with our analysis above. Median gross annual pay is also higher under the proposal’s 
threshold but the difference is less marked. In the scenario proposed in the Strawman document, an 
entry point at €20,000 per annum, half of the target population would earn between €20,000 and 
€30,000 a year and 90% would have incomes less than €50,000. Above that level, most employees 
already have a supplementary pension. A lower entry point, at €14,000 per annum, would imply a 
substantial increase in the numbers included in auto-enrolment, with close to 20% having incomes 
between €14,000 and €20,000, and the proportion under €30,000 would go up to 60%. 
While the current system of tax relief and the proposed State contributions (33% of the employee’s 
contributions) are not strictly comparable (the tax relief does not go into a pension pot, for instance), 
the latter would see the financial incentive to save for a pension improve for those paying income tax 
at the standard rate of 20%, but worsen for those over the standard rate threshold, who face a marginal 
rate of 40% (assuming relief is offered on the full contribution amount). The income figures imply 
that more than a half of the target population would benefit from this change, given the current 
standard rate threshold of €35,300 for single adults without children, and higher still for lone parents 
and couples. Moreover, recent research by McGowan and Lunn (2019) shows that the tax relief is 
poorly understood, suggesting that the simpler matching contributions design may also strengthen 
perceived incentives. 
An important consideration for auto-enrolment is the cost to employers. This cost would be higher in 
more labour-intensive sectors. Under both thresholds, over 20% of the target population work in 
wholesale and retail, followed by around 15% in manufacturing, both relatively labour-intensive 
sectors. It may also be noted that around 60% of the target population are based in workplaces of less 
than 50 people. While some of these workplaces are part of larger firms, small independent businesses 
are likely to have less administrative capacity. However, it is natural to assume that some of those 
smaller employment units are shops and branches of larger firms, such as retail companies, so it is not 
clear how much of the employer cost will fall onto small enterprises. 
4 Macro-Analysis Results 
We now turn to the macro-economic impacts that auto-enrolment can be expected to have in the 
medium term. These results, which refer to the scenarios described in Table 1, are derived from the 
                                                     
22 Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey. 
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estimates of the total of annual contributions shown in Table 8.  The opt-out rate is 30% in scenarios 
A1 to D2, and 10% in scenario E. 
Table 8: Total Annual Contributions by Scenario & Contributor in € million per year 
Scenario Employee Employer & State Total 
A1 & A2 823 1,098 1,921 
B1 137 183 320 
B2 274 366 640 
B3 412 548 960 
B4 549 732 1,281 
B5 686 915 1,601 
C 923 1,231 2,154 
D1 363 483 846 
D2 461 614 1,075 
E 1,058 1,412 2,470 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
4.1  Scenario A 
Table 9 shows the impact of scenario A1 on key macro variables five years after the proposal’s full 
implementation. Overall, the level of GDP is around 0.5% below baseline. The new contributions 
reduce disposable income and hence purchasing power, so the volume of consumption is 0.9% below 
baseline after five years. Lower consumption means that domestic demand is below where it 
otherwise would be and this has a knock-on effect on the demand for output from the non-traded 
sector. 
Table 9: Macroeconomic Impacts of Auto-enrolment 5 Years After Full Implementation (Scenarios A1-A2) 
Scenario A1 A2 
   
Percent deviation from baseline    
Gross domestic product at basic prices -0.5 -0.3 
Gross value added at basic prices (non-traded sector) -0.8 -0.6 
Gross value added at basic prices (traded sector) -0.4 -0.2 
Personal consumption of goods and services -0.9 -0.8 
Employed persons -0.6 -0.4 
Average wages 0.9 0.4 
Real personal disposable income -1.1 -1.0 
Financial assets of households 0.1 0.1 
  
 
 
Deviation from baseline 
 
 
Net immigration (000) -9.5 -6.8 
Unemployment rate 0.3 0.2 
Labour force participation rate -0.2 -0.1 
General government balance (% GDP) -0.3 -0.2 
  
 
 
Deviation from baseline (end of simulation period) 
 
 
General government debt (% GDP) 1.0 0.9 
Source: COSMO. 
The model assumes that workers bargain for their real after-tax wages, accounting for pension 
contributions. The new contributions therefore reduce the incentive to work and have a negative effect 
on labour supply. As a result, participation in the labour market is 0.2 percentage points below 
baseline after five years and net immigration ends up below where it otherwise would be. 
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Furthermore, some of the contributions are passed on to employers in terms of higher wage demands. 
At the end of the period of analysis, wages are around 0.9% above baseline. Higher wages result in a 
loss of competitiveness in the Irish economy and consequently output in the traded sector is around 
0.4% lower than baseline. 
Lower levels of activity in both the traded and non-traded sectors lead to lower labour demand and 
consequently, in this scenario, total employment is 0.6% below baseline and the unemployment rate is 
around 0.3 percentage points higher after five years. Although the fall in labour demand would tend to 
put downwards pressure on wages, the fall in labour supply has the opposite effect. The results 
suggest that the supply effect dominates. However, the wage increase is not sufficient to offset the 
increase in contributions, so real personal disposable income is below baseline after five years. 
However, the saved contributions raise the financial assets of households above where they otherwise 
would be. 
The lower level of activity in the economy has a negative impact on tax revenue and government 
transfer payments increase as a result of the unemployment rate being above baseline. Together with 
the funding of the government contribution, these factors have a negative impact on the public finance 
position. 
Table 9 also reports the simulation results from scenario A2, a variant of scenario A1 where labour 
supply is assumed to be unchanged and the contributions are purely treated as a negative income 
shock. In this scenario, the impact on real personal disposable income is similar to scenario A1. 
However, the overall macro-economic impact is more muted. In this case, there is less pressure to pay 
employees higher wages as we have assumed that workers do not let the fall in current income affect 
their decision to participate in the labour market. As a result, the impact on competitiveness and 
output in the traded sector is smaller. Likewise, the impact on net immigration and participation is 
smaller as it is no longer driven by workers’ reaction to lower income but by lower economic activity 
and labour demand than they otherwise would be. 
To put the simulation results in context, the overall labour market participation rate in 2018 was 
62.2%; applying the results to the labour market participation rate in 2018 implies the rate would be 
slightly lower at 62% in scenario A1 and 62.1% in scenario A2. In the remainder of this section, we 
focus on the general case where labour supply response is allowed. 
4.2 Scenario B 
The next set of scenarios examines a range of contribution rates. It is possible that the auto-enrolment 
scheme will be phased in over time, so here we examine separate scenarios where the contribution 
rates for employees is varied from 1% to 5% with proportionate adjustments to the employer and 
government contributions. 
The results are reported in Table 10. The policy change is transmitted through the economy in exactly 
the same manner as before. The overall macro-economic impact increases across the scenarios as the 
contribution rates increase. Overall, the impact on GDP ranges from -0.1% in the scenario with the 
lowest contributions (scenario B1) to -0.4% in the scenario with the highest contribution rate (scenario 
B5). If employees did not adjust their labour market behaviour in response to lower current net pay 
(as in scenario A2) the overall impacts would be more muted (see Table 15 in Appendix 5). 
Table 10: Macroeconomic Impacts of Auto-enrolment 5 Years After Full Implementation (Scenarios B1-B5) 
Scenario B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
      
Percent deviation from baseline      
Gross domestic product at basic prices -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 
Gross value added at basic prices (non-traded sector) -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 
Gross value added at basic prices (traded sector) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 
Personal consumption of goods and services -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 
Employed persons -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
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Average wages 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 
Real personal disposable income -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.9 
Financial assets of households 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
  
     
Deviation from baseline      
Net immigration (000) -1.6 -3.2 -4.7 -6.3 -7.9 
Unemployment rate 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Labour force participation rate 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
General government balance (% GDP) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 
      
Deviation from baseline (end of simulation period) 
     
General government debt (% GDP) 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Source: COSMO. 
4.3 Varying other parameters 
Following the micro-economic analysis, we also examine the macro-economic impacts of varying the 
income threshold and firm size. We also look at the effect of a lower opt-out rate. These results are 
presented in Table 11. The impacts associated with broadening the income limit to include those 
earning from €14,000 a year (scenario C) are very similar to scenario A1. This is not surprising as the 
micro estimates of the contributions are relatively similar. 
Table 11: Macroeconomic Impacts of Auto-enrolment 5 Years After Full Implementation (Scenarios C-E) 
 Scenario C D1 D2 E 
     
Percent deviation from baseline 
 
   
Gross domestic product at basic prices -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 
Gross value added at basic prices (non-traded sector) -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 
Gross value added at basic prices (traded sector) -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 
Personal consumption of goods and services -1.0 -0.4 -0.5 -1.1 
Employed persons -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.7 
Average wages 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.1 
Real personal disposable income -1.2 -0.5 -0.6 -1.4 
Financial assets of households 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
  
 
   
Deviation from baseline 
 
   
Net immigration (000) -10.6 -4.2 -5.3 -12.2 
Unemployment rate 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Labour force participation rate -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
General government balance (% GDP) -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4   
   
Deviation from baseline (end of simulation period) 
 
   
General government debt (% GDP) 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.4 
Source: COSMO. 
The two scenarios based on the micro estimates for those working in larger businesses (scenario D1) 
and smaller businesses (scenario D2) are also shown in Table 11. The macro impact is slightly larger 
when considering the employees who work in smaller businesses as the total amount of contributions 
is larger in this case. Broadly speaking these two scenarios add up to scenario A1. Finally, scenario E 
considers a lower opt-out rate of 10% and the impacts are essentially a scaled up version of scenario 
A1 as the opt-out rate applies to the entire target population. 
Simulation results for each scenario without labour supply response are shown in Table 13 in 
Appendix 3. 
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5 Conclusion 
This study provides new microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence relevant to the design and 
implementation of the auto-enrolment pension scheme described by the “Strawman” document. Our 
microeconomic analysis is done using SWITCH data, which is itself based on data drawn from SILC. 
This survey contains a broad range of information relevant for this task, including data on incomes, 
employee pension coverage, and demographic characteristics. The first task for this report was to 
construct a database for the analysis using this information. We use pooled data from SILC for 2013, 
2014 and 2015 in order to have a larger sample size. Incomes are uprated to 2019 levels, and sample 
weights are estimated to ensure that the database is representative of the 2019 situation in terms of 
employment and unemployment, income distribution and demographic characteristics. Crosschecks 
against other data sources (which contain some but not all of the relevant information) indicate that 
our unique dataset is broadly representative of the population in terms of income, demographics and 
pension coverage. 
 
Adequacy of pensions is a key driver for the auto-enrolment proposals. The measure of adequacy 
most often used is the “final earnings replacement rate”. McDonald et al. (2016) find that the 
correlation between the conventional earnings replacement rate and continuity in actual living 
standards is relatively low and outline a number of reasons why this may be so. We examine two of 
these reasons in our exploration of replacement rates: the differences arising from the use of net, 
rather than gross incomes, and the potential differences in housing costs due to the redemption of 
mortgages at or before retirement, as compared with the payment of mortgages during working ages. 
 
Using microsimulation techniques, we construct what we term “snapshot” replacement rates – the 
extent to which the SCP replaces the income currently gained from employment. Two main caveats 
are needed when interpreting these results. Pension replacement rates usually aim to assess pensions 
in relation to incomes near retirement: the snapshot only does so if incomes and pensions rise at the 
same rate over the time to retirement. Age-earnings profiles suggest that earnings typically rise with 
age before plateauing, so that final pension replacement rates would typically be lower than the 
snapshot. Secondly, the calculations are based on the maximum SCP, while significant numbers 
receive rates of 10 to 15% below that rate. 
 
Overall, the results on snapshot replacement rates, taking account of net as well as gross incomes, and 
of potential savings from outright home ownership in retirement, reinforce concerns about retirement 
provision for the potential target group for auto-enrolment, with incomes above €20,000 per year. 
Very few with incomes above €30,000 have a relatively high snapshot replacement rate of 70% or 
more, even if calculated on a net basis and adjusted for mortgage costs. For those with incomes 
between €20,000 and €30,000, 93% have net replacement rates, adjusted for mortgage costs, below 
the 70% level. 
 
The results also shed light on the snapshot replacement rates for low-income groups. We examine 
both the threshold currently suggested by the Strawman document (€20,000 per annum) and a lower 
threshold of €14,000 per annum. Snapshot replacement rates for a majority of those in the €14,000 to 
€20,000 bracket, tend to be above 70% on both a gross and net basis. As noted, however, expected 
pension replacement rates in relation to final incomes would be below these levels for many 
individuals, due to individual wage progression and/or lower than maximum state pension. Auto-
enrolment will, of course, provide a boost to replacement rates based on both the State and 
supplementary pensions and this benefit is likely to be between one-fifth and one quarter of income23.  
                                                     
23 Assuming full participation in the autoenrolment scheme over a  45 year period 
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Our analysis also provides a profile of the size and nature of the auto-enrolment population, based on 
two potential cut-offs (€14,000 and €20,000). We estimate that some 584,000 employees aged 23 to 
60 would be covered by the Strawman proposal if the earnings threshold were set at €20,000 per 
annum. If instead, the €14,000 level were used, the target population is estimated at close to 724,000.  
 
What is the composition of this target population? In the scenario proposed in the Strawman 
document, an entry point at €20,000 per annum, half of the target population would earn between 
€20,000 and €30,000 a year and 90% %would have incomes less than €50,000. Above that level, most 
employees already have a supplementary pension. A lower entry point, at €14,000 per annum, would 
imply a substantial increase in the numbers included in auto-enrolment, with close to 20% having 
incomes between €14,000 and €20,000, and the proportion under €30,000 would go up to 60%. 
 
In terms of age, around 40% of the target population are under 30, and a further 30% would be under 
40. These results do not depend on the level of the annual earnings entry point, unlike the gender 
balance. With the €20,000 earnings threshold, our estimates suggest that about 57% of those auto-
enrolled would be men. This arises because women with incomes above €20,000 have higher pension 
coverage than men – largely due to higher numbers of women in public sector jobs. If the lower 
threshold of €14,000 were used, the proportion of those auto-enrolled who were men would fall to 
52%, as more low-paid women would be included. The wholesale/retail and manufacturing sectors are 
the single sectors containing the largest proportion of workers who will be auto-enrolled. Smaller 
employment units (less than 50 staff) will also be more affected by auto-enrolment than firms 
employing 50 and more staff.  
 
The decision regarding the appropriate level of the earnings threshold is a complex one. The 
Strawman document indicates that the two key considerations in setting the earnings trigger level are 
“the affordability of contributions for people on very low incomes and the target retirement income 
replacement rate”. Our analysis provides some further detail on income replacement rates to inform 
this decision. As noted, however, these are “snapshot” income replacement rates, as per the Strawman 
calculations, based on current earnings and a maximum SCP.  Typically individual income growth, 
related to experience and career progression, will mean that replacement rates with respect to final 
earnings will be lower than this, particularly given that over 40% of the target population have third 
level education. For those with fewer PRSI contributions, the actual rate of the State pension that they 
receive will be below the maximum SCP rate, also reducing replacement rates. This points towards 
possible inclusion of some of those with incomes below €20,000 within the auto-enrolment scheme.24 
By comparison, the UK design (which currently incorporates an earnings disregard of £6,136) has a 
much lower income threshold (£10,000) for auto-enrolment, and allows an opt-out. If individuals 
regard the contributions as unaffordable, they have the ability to opt out.25 Overall, opt-out rates in the 
UK have remained low (below 10%), even after an increase in employee contribution rates from 1% 
to 3% in April 2018. The exact structure of the system is likely to differ in Ireland, however, so it is 
not possible to estimate opt-out rates in advance of roll-out of the scheme.  
Our analysis of the macroeconomic impact builds on the profile of contributors and contributions 
under the auto-enrolment scheme provided by SWITCH. The macroeconomic analysis uses the 
COSMO model, which, like most macroeconomic models, is concerned with average and total effects 
and not their distribution. We use the microeconomic analysis to establish the size of the target 
population and the likely scale of contributions. We then examines the macroeconomic impact of such 
                                                     
24 Those on income below the autoenrolment level can, of course, opt in to the scheme voluntarily. 
25 In the UK system those autoenrolled can opt out immediately while in Ireland it is proposed to have a 
minimum 6 month contribution period before being able to opt out.  
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a scheme, incorporating employee contributions, matching employer contributions and a government 
contribution equivalent to a third of the employee contribution. We consider a range of scenarios 
based on different contribution rates and with variants of other features of the ‘Strawman’ proposals 
and compares them to a ‘no policy change’ baseline. 
Overall, the introduction of contributions to retirement savings schemes leads to lower levels of 
economic activity in the short to medium-term as they leave households with lower disposable income 
and have a negative impact on labour demand. However, it is reasonable to assume that the negative 
impact would be somewhat alleviated over time as there will be a future increased income stream for 
households. It is important to re-iterate one of the major caveats of this study, which is that we are 
modelling the cost associated with an auto-enrolment scheme. We have no estimates for how much 
such a scheme would benefit employees in the longer-term by providing additional income in 
retirement and so this effect could not be included in this analysis. Furthermore, in terms of employee 
behaviour, there is some uncertainty regarding the impact of the introduction of auto-enrolment. There 
have been no empirical studies examining the impact of auto-enrolment on labour supply, in countries 
that have introduced this type of system, that we can draw on for this analysis so we consider two 
alternative approaches in this study. The results here show that where employees do not adjust their 
labour market behaviour in response to lower current net pay (as in Scenario A2), the overall macro 
impacts would be more muted. 
Auto-enrolment is likely to have a positive effect on the economy over the longer term. From the 
perspective of individuals, an auto-enrolment scheme allows them to smooth consumption over the 
life course. Although they will have less income and consumption now, the key point is that by 
deferring income they will have higher income in retirement than otherwise would have been the case. 
This is equivalent to saying there will be a positive income shock in the future which would raise 
household incomes above where they otherwise would have been. This will have a positive impact on 
key macro variables like consumption, domestic demand employment and output. 
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6 Appendix 1 – Technical note on SWITCH (construction and validation) 
The input data for SWITCH is a database compiled from the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the SILC 
and made representative of the current (2019) population. To this end, we make two types of 
adjustments. Firstly, we uprate monetary variables using the CSO’s actual growth figures and the 
ESRI’s latest forecasts. In doing so we distinguish between earnings growth in the public and private 
sectors, and within the latter between employees and the self-employed. We then adjust the SILC 
weights using a rich set of population characteristics, including estimates of employment levels, 
households’ incomes and welfare receipts of most welfare schemes, ensuring good representativeness 
of the income distribution26. Reweighting is partly motivated by the need to project the data to the 
relevant year, but also by the fact that the raw weights do not provide a very representitive picture of 
the income distribution (Callan et al., 2011). Here we show some important validation results. 
Table 12 shows the ratio of our population estimates to control totals (ESRI projections for 2019 
based on Census and LFS data). Apart from a slightly lower number of unemployed women, the 
adjusted weights for 2019 provide a close fit for work status and the age profile of the population. 
Table 12: Ratio of Population Estimates to Control Totals Using Adjusted Weights (%) 
 
Men Women 
ILO work status   
At work 101 103 
Unemployed 105 91 
   
Age   
0-4 100 100 
5-12 100 100 
13-18 100 100 
19-24 100 100 
25-44 100 100 
45-64 100 100 
65+ 100 100 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights). 
Figure 1 compares the number of tax units, aggregate income, income tax and USC by annual gross 
income from the Revenue Commissioner’s Pre-Budget 2019 Ready Reckoner and SWITCH’s input 
data. Again, the data provides a remarkably close fit to the benchmark. 
  
                                                     
26 We use the CALMAR program developed by INSEE. 
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Figure 1: Number of Tax Units, Aggregate Income and Aggregate Tax (Income Tax and USC) by Gross Annual Income: 
Revenue Commissioner’s Pre-Budget 2019 Ready Reckoner and Input Data for SWITCH (2019) 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis of the 2013, 2014 and 2015 waves of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (uprated monetary 
values and adjusted weights).
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7 Appendix 2- Supplementary Pension Estimates 
Table 13: Snapshot gross replacement rates based on the maximum SCP and secondary benefits 
           
Earnings Contribution Rate 
Supplementary 
Pension € p.a. 
Supplementary 
Pension % of 
Earnings 
Contribution 
Period (Years) 
Gross RR 
(SCP + 
Supplementary) 
€33,000.00 14% €9,038.00 27.4% 45 67% 
€35,000.00 14% €9,588.00 27.4% 45 64% 
€40,000.00 14% €10,958.00 27.4% 45 60% 
€50,000.00 14% €13,688.00 27.4% 45 53% 
€60,000.00 14% €16,438.00 27.4% 45 49% 
€70,000.00 14% €19,188.00 27.4% 45 46% 
Source: DEASP calculations using the Pensions Authority Calculator, available at 
https://www.pensionsauthority.ie/en/Calculators/Pension_Calculator/. 
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8 Appendix 3 - Secondary Benefits 
Table 2 examined gross replacement rates based on the maximum SCP. How are these results affected 
by the inclusion of the value of secondary benefits associated with the SCP? These benefits (the 
Living Alone, Telephone Support and Fuel allowances, Household Benefits Package and Free TV 
Licence) amount to a little over €1,800 for the year 2019, and are given to everyone here for 
simplicity. Table 14 shows that this brings the snapshot gross replacement rate for 95 per cent of those 
with incomes in the range €14,000 to €20,000 above 70 per cent. Gross replacement rates for higher 
income levels are also somewhat increased, but more than 90 per cent of those with incomes in the 
€20,000 to €30,000 range have snapshot gross replacement rates below 70 per cent. 
  
Table 14: Snapshot gross replacement rates based on the maximum SCP and secondary benefits 
 Gross pay in thousand euros per year 
Replacement rate in % ≥ 0, < 14 ≥ 14, < 20 ≥ 20, < 30 ≥ 30, < 50 ≥ 50, < 75 
≥ 0, < 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
≥ 10, < 20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.9 
≥ 20, < 30 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 96.1 
≥ 30, < 40 0.0 0.0 0.2 48.3 0.0 
≥ 40, < 50 0.0 0.0 9.2 45.2 0.0 
≥ 50, < 60 0.0 4.5 48.9 0.0 0.0 
≥ 60, < 70 0.1 0.9 34.4 0.0 0.0 
≥ 70, < 80 0.6 36.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 
≥ 80 99.3 58.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: authors’ calculations based on SWITCH data. 
Note: due to rounding error column totals may not sum to 100. 
 
While indicative of the sensitivity of lower earners’ gross replacement rates to the inclusion of 
secondary benefits, only a minority of pensioners will qualify for all four of these secondary benefits27 
as entitlement will depend on means and household composition. The results shown here, therefore, 
can be seen as a potential maximum gross replacement rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 For example, in 2018 there were 411,660 in receipt of the SCP while only 76,731 received the Living Alone 
Allowance. All 2018 numbers provided by Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection. 
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9 Appendix 4 – Technical Note on COSMO 
The COSMO macroeconomic model initially focuses on production relationships, and then examines 
the downstream expenditure and income consequences.28 On the production side, COSMO 
distinguishes between the traded sector, the non-traded sector and the government sector. Each 
production sector is governed by an underlying production function that ultimately drives medium-
term growth. Output in the traded sector is driven by world demand and cost competitiveness. The 
non-traded sector is driven by domestic demand. The public sector is policy-driven, and includes the 
treatment of borrowing and debt accumulation. Demand is disaggregated along standard national 
accounting lines, i.e. household consumption, public consumption, investment, exports and imports. 
Tensions between supply and demand feed back into the economy through the price system. 
Households make consumption decisions based on the current income and holdings of wealth 
(financial and non-financial). They also supply labour, with the supply of labour dependent on after-
tax wages and migration, as well as demographic assumptions. The labour market is open and through 
migration is influenced by conditions in alternative labour markets. Firms employ labour and make 
investment decisions, with their factor demands derived from the underlying production functions. 
Wages are determined in a bargaining model, and influenced by the factors that affect the supply and 
demand for labour (e.g. prices, taxes). 
The government sector raises taxes, transfers income to households, employs labour and invests in 
capital. Any deficit accumulates onto the government debt stock, and interest must be paid on this 
debt. While monetary policy is exogenously set by an external ECB, borrowing rates include an 
endogenous margin, which depend on the state of the economy and the health of the banking system.
                                                     
28 See Bergin et al (2017) for a full description of the mechanisms and behaviour of the model. 
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10 Appendix 5 – Additional macro-economic analysis 
Table 13: Macroeconomic Impacts of Auto-enrolment 5 Years After Full Implementation, Assuming No Labour Supply Response (Scenarios B1-E) 
 Scenario B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 C D1 D2 E 
          
Percent deviation from baseline 
     
    
Gross domestic product at basic prices -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 
Gross value added at basic prices (non-traded sector) -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 
Gross value added at basic prices (traded sector) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Personal consumption of goods and services -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -1.0 
Employed persons -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 
Average wages 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Real personal disposable income -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.5 -0.6 -1.3 
Financial assets of households 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
  
     
    
Deviation from baseline 
     
    
Net immigration (000) -1.1 -2.2 -3.3 -4.5 -5.6 -7.5 -2.9 -3.7 -8.6 
Unemployment rate 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Labour force participation rate 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
General government balance (% GDP) 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3       
    
Deviation from baseline (end of simulation period) 
     
    
General government debt (% GDP) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.5 1.1 
Source: COSMO. 
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